Private Query Release Assisted by Public Data by Bassily, Raef et al.
Private Query Release Assisted by Public Data
Raef Bassily* Albert Cheu† Shay Moran‡ Aleksandar Nikolov§
Jonathan Ullman¶ Zhiwei Steven Wu||
April 24, 2020
Abstract
We study the problem of differentially private query release assisted by access to public data. In
this problem, the goal is to answer a large classH of statistical queries with error no more than α using
a combination of public and private samples. The algorithm is required to satisfy differential privacy
only with respect to the private samples. We study the limits of this task in terms of the private and
public sample complexities.
First, we show that we can solve the problem for any query class H of finite VC-dimension using
only d/α public samples and
√
pd3/2/α2 private samples, where d and p are the VC-dimension and
dual VC-dimension of H, respectively. In comparison, with only private samples, this problem cannot
be solved even for simple query classes with VC-dimension one, and without any private samples,
a larger public sample of size d/α2 is needed. Next, we give sample complexity lower bounds that
exhibit tight dependence on p and α. For the class of decision stumps, we give a lower bound of
√
p/α
on the private sample complexity whenever the public sample size is less than 1/α2. Given our upper
bounds, this shows that the dependence on
√
p is necessary in the private sample complexity. We also
give a lower bound of 1/α on the public sample complexity for a broad family of query classes, which
by our upper bound, is tight in α.
1 Introduction
The ability to answer statistical queries on a sensitive data set in a privacy-preserving way is one of
the most fundamental primitives in private data analysis. In particular, this task has been at the center
of the literature of differential privacy since its emergence [DN03, DMNS06, BLR13] and is central to
the upcoming 2020 US Census release [DLS+17]. In its basic form, the problem of differentially private
query release can be described as follows. Given a class H of queries h : X → {±1}1 defined over some
domain X , and a data set ~x = (x1, . . . ,xn) of i.i.d. drawn samples from some unknown distribution D
over X , the goal is to construct an (ε,δ)-differentially private algorithm that, given H and ~x, outputs a
mapping G : H → [−1,1] such that for every h ∈ H, G(h) gives an accurate estimate for the true mean
E
x∼D [h(x)] up to some additive error α.
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1In this work, we focus on classes of binary functions (known in the literature of DP as counting queries).
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A central question in private query release is concerned with characterizing the private sample com-
plexity, which is the least amount of private samples required to perform this task up to some ad-
ditive error α. This question has been extensively studied in the literature on differential privacy
[DN03, HR10, MN12, BLR13, BUV18, SU15]. For general query classes, it was shown that the opti-
mal bound on the private sample complexity in terms of |X |, |H|, and the privacy parameters is attained
by the Private Multiplicative Weights (PMW) algorithm due to Hardt and Rothblum [HR10]. This op-
timality was established by the lower bound due to Bun et al. [BUV18]. This result implied the impos-
sibility of differentially private query release for certain classes of infinite size. Moreover, subsequent
results by [BNSV15, ALMM19] implied that this impossibility is true even for a simple class such as
one-dimensional thresholds over R. On the other hand, without any privacy constraints, the query re-
lease problem is equivalent to attaining uniform convergence overH, and hence the sample complexity
is given by d/α2, where d is the VC-dimension ofH.
In practice, it is often feasible to collect some amount of “public” data that poses no privacy concerns.
For example, in the language of consumer privacy, there is considerable amount of data collected from
the so-called “opt-in” users, who voluntarily offer or sell their data to companies or organizations. Such
data is deemed by its original owner to pose no threat to personal privacy. There are also a variety of
other sources of public data that can be harnessed.
Motivated by the above observation, and by the limitations in the standard model of differentially
private query release, in this work, we study a relaxed setting of this problem, which we call Public-
data-Assisted Private (PAP) query release. In this setting, the query-release algorithm has access to two
types of samples from the unknown distribution: private samples that contain personal and sensitive
information (as in the standard setting) and public samples. The goal is to design algorithms that can
exploit as little public data as possible to achieve non-trivial savings in sample complexity over standard
DP query-release algorithms, while still providing strong privacy guarantees for the private dataset.
1.1 Our results
In this work we study the private and public sample complexities of PAP query-release algorithms,
and give upper and lower bounds on both. To describe our results, we will use d and p to denote the
VC-dimension and dual VC-dimension of the query class H, respectively. We will use α to denote the
target error for query release.
1. Upper bounds: We give a construction of a PAP algorithm that solves the query release problem
for any query class H using only ≈ d/α public samples, and ≈ √pd3/2/α2 private samples. Recall
that d/α2 samples are necessary even without privacy constraints; therefore, our upper bound on the
public sample complexity shows a nearly quadratic saving.
2. Lower bound on private sample complexity: We show that there is a query class H with VC-
dimension d = log(p) and dual VC-dimension p such that any PAP algorithm either requiresΩ(1/α2)
public samples or requires Ω˜(
√
p/α) total samples. Thus the
√
p dependence above is unavoidable.
For this class, O(log(p)/α2) public samples are enough to solve the problem with no private samples,
and O˜(log(p)/α2 +
√
p/α) private samples are enough to solve the problem with no public samples.
Thus, for this function class public samples essentially do not help improve the overall sample com-
plexity, unless there are nearly enough public samples to solve the problem without private samples.
3. Lower bound on public sample complexity: We show that if the class H has infinite Littlestone di-
mension,2 then any PAP query-release algorithm for H must have public sample complexity Ω(1/α).
The simplest example of such a class is the class of one-dimensional thresholds over R. This class has
VC-dimension 1, and therefore demonstrates that the upper bound above is nearly tight.
2The Littlestone dimension is a combinatorial parameter that arises in online learning [Lit88, BDPSS09].
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1.2 Techniques
Upper bounds: The first key step in our construction for the upper bound is to use the public data to
construct a finite class H˜ that forms a “good approximation” of the original classH. Such approximation
is captured via the notion of an α-cover (Definition 1). The number of public examples that suffices
to construct such approximation is about d/α [ABM19]. Given this finite class H˜, we then reduce the
original domainX to a finite setXH˜ of representative domain points, which is defined via an equivalence
relation induced byH over X (Definition 2). Using Sauer’s Lemma, we can show that the size of such a
representative domain is at most
(
e |H˜|
p
)p
, where p is the dual VC-dimension of H. At this point, we can
reduce our problem to DP query-release for the finite query class H˜ and the finite domain XH˜, which we
can solve via the PMW algorithm [HR10, DR14].
Lower bound on private sample complexity: The proof of the lower bound is based on robust tracing
attacks [BUV18, DSS+15, SU15]. That work proves privacy lower bounds for the class of decision stumps
over the domain {−1,1}p, which contains queries of the form hj (x) = xj for some j ∈ [p]. Specifically,
they show that for any algorithm that takes at most s ≈ √p/α samples, and releases the class of decision
stumps with accuracy α, there is some attacker that can “detect” the presence of at least t ≈ 1/α2 of the
samples. Therefore, if the number of public samples is at most t −1, the attacker can detect the presence
of one of the private samples, which means the algorithm cannot be differentially private with respect
to the private samples.
Lower bound on public sample complexity: This lower bound is derived in two steps. First, we show
that PAP query-release for a class H implies PAP learning (studied in [BNS13, ABM19]3) of the same
class with the same amount of public data. This step follows from a straightforward generalization of
an analogous result by [BNS13] in the standard DP model with no public data. Second, we invoke the
lower bound of [ABM19] on the public sample complexity of PAP learning.
1.3 Other related work
To the best of our knowledge, our work is the first to formally study differentially private query
release assisted with public data. There has been work on private supervised-learning setting with
access to limited public data, that is PAP learning. In particular, the notion of differentially private PAC
learning assisted with public data was introduced by Beimel et al. in [BNS13], where it was called “semi-
private learning.” They gave a construction of a learning algorithm in this setting, and derived upper
bounds on the private and public sample complexities. The paper [ABM19] revisited this problem and
gave nearly optimal bounds on the private and public sample complexities in the agnostic PAC model.
The work of [ABM19] emphasizes the notion of α-covers as a useful tool in the construction of such
learning algorithms. Our PAP algorithm nicely leverages this notion in the query-release setting.
In a similar vein, there has been work on other relaxations of private learning that do not require
all parts of the data to be private. For example, [CH11, BNS13] studied the notion of “label-private
learning,” where only the labels in the training set are considered private. Another line of work consid-
ers the setting in which the learning task can be reduced to privately answering classification queries
[HCB16, PAE+17, PSM+18, BTT18, NB19], where the goal is to construct a differentially private classifi-
cation algorithm that predicts the labels of a sequence of public feature-vectors such that the predictions
are differentially private in the private training dataset.
3This notion was termed “semi-private” learning in their work.
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Figure 1: A representative domain for a finite class of halfspaces
2 Preliminaries
We use X to denote an arbitrary data universe, D to denote a distribution over X , and H ⊆ {±1}X to
denote a binary hypothesis class.
2.1 Tools from learning theory
The VC dimension of a binary hypothesis classH⊆ {±1}X is denoted by VC(H).
We will use the following notion of coverings:
Definition 1 (α-cover for a hypothesis class). A family of hypotheses H˜ is said to form an α-cover for a
hypothesis classH⊆ {±1}X with respect to a distribution D over X if for every h ∈ H, there is h˜ ∈ H˜ such
that P
x∼D
[
h(x) , h˜(x)
]
≤ α.
Definition 2 (Representative domain (a.k.a. the dual class)). Let H˜ ⊆ {±1}X be a hypothesis class. De-
fine an equivalence relation on X by x ' x′ if and only if (∀h ∈ H˜) : h(x) = h(x′). The representative
domain induced by H˜ on X , denoted by XH˜, is a complete set of distinct representatives from X for this
equivalence relation.
For example, let H˜ be a class of M binary thresholds over R given by: htj (x) = +1 iff x ≤ tj , j ∈
[M], −∞ < t1 < t2 < . . . < tM < ∞. Then, a representative domain in this case is a set of M + 1 distinct
elements; one from each of the following intervals (−∞, t1], (t1, t2], . . . , (tM ,∞). More generally, if H˜ is a
class of halfspaces then a representative domain contains exactly one point in each cell of the hyperplane
arrangement induced by H˜ (see Figure 1).
Note that when H˜ is finite then any representative domain for H˜ has size at most 2|H˜|, since the
equivalence class of each x ∈ X is determined by the binary vector (h(x))h∈H˜. Moreover, one can also
make the following simple claim, which is a direct consequence of the Sauer-Shelah Lemma [Sau72]
together with the fact that a representative domain XH˜ has a one-to-one correspondence with the dual
class of H˜. Below, we use VC⊥(H) to denote the dual VC-dimension of a hypothesis class H, namely,
VC⊥(H) is the VC-dimension of the dual class ofH.
Claim 3. Let H˜ be a finite class of binary functions defined over a domain X . Then, the size of a representative
domain XH˜ satisfies: |XH˜ | ≤
(
e |H˜|
VC⊥(H˜)
)VC⊥(H˜)
.
The following useful fact gives a worst-case upper bound on the dual VC-dimension in terms of the
VC-dimension.
Fact 4 ([Ass83]). LetH be a binary hypothesis class. The dual VC-dimension ofH satisfies: VC⊥(H) < 2VC(H)+1.
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Notation: In Section 3, we will use the following notation. Let H˜ be a hypothesis class defined over a
domain X . For any x ∈ X , we define XH˜(x) as the representative s ∈ XH˜ such that x ' s, where ' is the
equivalence relation described in Definition 2. Note that by definition this s ∈ XH˜ is unique. Moreover,
for any n and any ~x = (x1, . . . ,xn) ∈ X n, we define XH˜(~x) ,
(
XH˜(x1), . . . ,XH˜(xn)
)
.
Definition 5 (Query Release). Given a distribution D over X and a binary hypothesis class H, a query
release data structure G ∈ [−1,1]H (equivalently, G : H → [−1,1]) estimates the expected label E
x∼D [h(x)]
for all h ∈ H. The worst-case error is defined as
ErrD,H(G) , sup
h∈H
|G(h)− E
x∼D [h(x)] |.
2.2 Tools from Differential Privacy
Two datasets ~x,~x ′ ∈ X n are neighboring when they differ on one element.
Definition 6 (Differential Privacy). A randomized algorithm A : X n→Z is (ε,δ)-differentially private if
for all neighboring ~x,~x ′ and all Z ⊆ Z
P
[
A(~x) ∈ Z] ≤ eεP[A(~x ′) ∈ Z]+ δ
Private Multiplicative Weights (PMW): In our construction in Section 3, we will use, as a black box, a
well-studied algorithm in differential privacy known as Private Multiplicative-Weights [HR10]. We will
use a special case of the offline version of the PMW algorithm. Namely, the input query class H˜ is finite,
and PMW runs over all the queries in the input class (in any order) to perform its updates, and finally
outputs a query release data structure G˜ ∈ [−1,1]H˜. When the input private data set ~s is drawn i.i.d.
from some unknown distribution D˜, the accuracy goal is to have a data structure G˜ such that ErrD˜,H˜(G˜)
is small. The outline (inputs and output of the PMW algorithm) is described in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1: An outline for the Private Multiplicative Weights Algorithm (PMW)
Input: Private data set ~s ∈ X˜ n (where X˜ is a finite domain); A finite query (hypothesis) class
H˜ ⊆ {±1}X˜ ; accuracy parameters α,β; privacy parameters ε,δ.
Output: A data structure G˜ : H˜ → [−1,1].
The following lemma is an immediate corollary of the accuracy guarantee of the PMW algorithm
[HR10, DR14]. In particular, it follows from combining the empirical accuracy of PMW with a standard
uniform-convergence argument.
Lemma 7 (Corollary of Theorem 4.15 in [DR14]). For any 0 < ε,δ < 1, the PMW algorithm is (ε,δ)-
differentially private. Let D˜ be any distribution over X˜ . For any 0 < α,β < 1, given an input data set ~s ∼ D˜n such
that
n ≥
200 ·
√
log
(
|X˜ |
)
log(2/δ)
(
log
(
|H˜|
)
+ log
(
128 log(|X˜ |)
α2β
))
εα2
,
then, with probability at least 1− β, PMW outputs a data structure G˜ satisfying ErrD˜,H˜(G˜) ≤ α.
2.3 Our Model: PAP Query Release
In this paper, we study an extension of the problem of differentially private query release [DR14]
where the input data have two types: private and public. Formally, let D be any distribution over a data
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Algorithm 2: An outline for a generic Public-data-Assisted Private (PAP) algorithm for query re-
lease
Input: Private data set ~x ∈ X n; public data set ~w ∈ Xm; A query (hypothesis) classH⊆ {±1}X ;
accuracy and confidence parameters α,β; privacy parameters ε,δ.
Output: A data structure G :H→ [−1,1].
domain X . LetH⊆ {±1}X be a class of binary queries. We consider a family of algorithms whose generic
description (namely, inputs and outputs) is given by Algorithm 2.
Given the query classH, a private data set ~x ∼Dn (i.e., a data set whose elements belong to n private
users), and a public data set ~w ∈ Xm (i.e., a data set whose elements belong to m users with no privacy
constraint), the algorithm outputs a query release data structure G : H→ [−1,1]. Such an algorithm is
required to be (ε,δ)-differentially private but only with respect to the private data set. We call such an al-
gorithm Public-data-Assisted Private (PAP) query-release algorithm. The accuracy/utility of the algorithm
is determined by the worst-case estimation error incurred by its output data structure G on any query
(hypothesis) h ∈ H.
Definition 8 ((α,β,ε,δ) PAP query-release algorithm). Let H ⊆ {±1}X be a query class. Let A : X ∗ →
[−1,1]H be a randomized algorithm in the family outlined in Algorithm 2. We say that A is (α,β,ε,δ)
Public-data-Assisted Private (PAP) query-release algorithm forHwith private sample size n and public
sample size m if the following conditions hold:
1. For every distributionD overX , given data sets ~x ∼Dn and ~w ∼Dm as inputs toA, with probability
at least 1 − β (over the choice of ~x, ~w, and the random coins of A), A outputs a function (data
structure) A (~x, ~w) = G ∈ [−1,1]H satisfying ErrD,H(G) ≤ α.
2. For all ~w ∈ Xm, A (·, ~w) is (ε,δ)-differentially private.
Remark 9. In our description in Algorithm 2, the algorithm is required to output a data structureG :H→ [−1,1]
and not necessarily a “synthetic” data set ~v ∈ X n′ for some number n′ as in what is referred to as “private proper
sanitizers” in [BNS13]. In that special case, obviously the output data set can be used to define a data structureG′ ;
namely, for any h ∈ H, G′(h) , 1n′
∑
i∈[n′] h(vi). Moreover, in the general case, ignoring computational complexity,
the output data structure can also be used to construct a data set as pointed out in [BNS13, Remark 2.18] . In
particular, given a data structureG whose error ≤ α, then it suffices find a data set ~v ∈ X n′ , where n′ > VC(H)/α2,
such that | 1n′
∑
i∈[n′] h(vi)) −G(h)| ≤ 2α for all h ∈ H, and hence the accuracy requirement would follow by the
triangle inequality. Also, we know that this data set must exist. This is because by a standard uniform-convergence
argument, a data set ~s ∼ Dn′ will, with a non-zero probability, satisfy | 1n′
∑
i∈[n′] h(si)) − E
x∼D [h](x)| ≤ α for all
h ∈ H, and hence, by the triangle inequality, | 1n′
∑
i∈[n′] h(si))−G(h)| ≤ 2α for all h ∈ H.
3 A PAP Query-Release Algorithm for Classes of Finite VC-Dimension
We now describe a construction of a public-data-assisted private query release algorithm that works
for any class with a finite VC-dimension.
Our construction is given by Algorithm 3. The key idea of the construction is to use the public data
to create a finite α-cover H˜ for the input query class H (see Definition 1), then, run the PMW algorithm
on the finite cover and the representative domain XH˜ given by the dual of H˜ (see Definition 2).
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Algorithm 3: APAP Public-data-assisted Private Query-Release Algorithm
Input: Private data set ~x = (x1, . . . ,xn) ∈ X n; public data set ~w = (w1, . . . ,wm) ∈ Xm; A query class
H⊆ {±1}X ; accuracy and confidence parameters α,β; privacy parameters ε,δ.
Output: A data structure G :H→ [−1,1].
/* Use public data to construct α-cover for H */
Let T = {wˆ1, . . . , wˆmˆ} be the set of points in X appearing at least once in ~w.
Let ΠH(T ) = {(h(wˆ1), . . . ,h(wˆmˆ)) : h ∈ H} .
Initialize H˜ = ∅.
For each ~y = (y1, . . . , ymˆ) ∈ΠH(T )
Add to H˜ one arbitrary h ∈ H that satisfies h(wˆj ) = yj for every j = 1, . . . , mˆ.
Let XH˜ be a representative domain induced by H˜ on X (as in Definition 2).
/* replace each point in the private data set ~x with its representative in XH˜ */
~s←XH˜(~x)
/* Run PMW algorithm over the data-set of representatives ~s ∈ X nH˜ and H˜ */
G˜← PMW
(
~s, H˜, α/2, β/2, ε, δ
)
.
Return G = G
(
~w , H˜ , G˜ , ·
)
/* see code below */
////////////////////////////////////////
/* Construct a function G :H→ [−1,1] as follows: */
Function G = G
(
~w , H˜ , G˜ , ·
)
Input: A query (hypothesis) h ∈ H.
Output: An estimate r ∈ [−1,1].
h˜← ProjectH˜, ~w(h),
where ProjectH˜, ~w(h) denotes the unique h˜ ∈ H˜ s.t.
(
h˜(w1), . . . , h˜(wm)
)
=
(
h(w1), . . . ,h(wm)
)
r← G˜(h˜)
Return r
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Theorem 10 (Upper Bound). APAP (Algorithm 3) is an (α,β,ε,δ) public-data-assisted private query-release
algorithm forH whose private and public sample complexities satisfy:
n =O
 (d log(1/α) + log(1/β))3/2√p log(1/δ)εα2
 ,
m =O
(
d log(1/α) + log(1/β)
α
)
,
where d = VC(H) and p = VC⊥(H).
Remark: By Fact 4, we can further bound the private sample complexity for general query classes as
n =O
 (d log(1/α) + log(1/β))3/2√2d log(1/δ)εα2
 .
In the proof of Theorem 10, we use the following lemma from [ABM19].
Lemma 11 (Lemma 3.3 in [ABM19]). Let ~w ∼ Dm. Then, with probability at least 1 − β/2, the family H˜
constructed in Step 3 of Algorithm 3 is an α/4-cover for H w.r.t. D. In particular, for every h ∈ H, we have
P
x∼D
[
h(x) , h˜(x)
]
≤ α/4, where h˜ = ProjectH˜, ~w(h) (see Algorithm 3 for the definition of ProjectH˜, ~w ), as long as
m =Ω
(
d log(1/α) + log(1/β)
α
)
Proof of Theorem 10. First, note that for any realization of the public data set ~w,APAP is (ε,δ)-differentially
private w.r.t. the private data set. Indeed, the private data set ~x is only used to construct~s = XH˜(~x), which
is the input data set to the PMW algorithm. The output of PMW is then used to construct the output
data structure G. Moreover, for any pair of neighboring data sets ~x,~x ′ , the pair XH˜(~x), XH˜(~x ′) cannot
differ in more than one element. Hence, (ε,δ)-differential privacy of our construction follows from (ε,δ)-
differential privacy of the PMW algorithm together with the fact that differential privacy is closed under
post-processing.
Next, we prove the accuracy guarantee of our construction. By Lemma 11, it follows that with prob-
ability at least 1 − β/2, we have sup
h∈H
∣∣∣∣ E
x∼D [h(x)] − Ex∼D
[
h˜(x)
] ∣∣∣∣ ≤ α/2, where h˜ = ProjectH˜, ~w(h). Hence, it
suffices to show that with probability at least 1 − β/2, ErrD,H˜(G˜) ≤ α/2 (recall that G˜ is the output data
structure of the PMW algorithm). Note that by Sauer’s lemma, we know | H˜ | ≤
(
em
d
)d
, where d = VC(H).
From the setting of m in the theorem statement, we hence have
log
(
|H˜|
)
=O
(
d log(1/α) + d
(
log
(
1+
log(1/β)
d
)))
=O (d log(1/α) + log(1/β)) ,
Moreover, by Claim 3, we have
log
(
|XH˜ |
)
=O
(
VC⊥(H˜)
(
d log(1/α) + log(1/β)
))
≤O
(
p
(
d log(1/α) + log(1/β)
))
,
where p = VC⊥(H). Thus, given the setting of n in the theorem statement, Lemma 7 implies that with
probability at least 1− β/2, our instantiation of the PMW algorithm yields G˜ that satisfies
α/2 ≥ sup
h˜∈H˜
∣∣∣∣ G˜(h˜)− E
x∼D
[
h˜
(
XH˜(x)
)]∣∣∣∣
= sup
h˜∈H˜
∣∣∣∣ G˜(h˜)− E
x∼D
[
h˜(x)
]∣∣∣∣
= ErrD,H˜
(
G˜
)
,
which completes the proof.
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4 A Lower Bound for Releasing Decision Stumps
In this section we give an example of a hypothesis class—decision stumps on over the domain X =
{±1}p—where additional public data “does not help” for private query release. This concept class can be
released using either O˜(log(p)/α2+
√
p/α) private samples and no public samples, or using O(log(p)/α2)
public samples and no private samples. However, we show that every PAP query-release algorithm
requires either Ω˜(
√
p/α) private samples or Ω(1/α2) public samples. That is, making some samples
public does not reduce the overall sample complexity until the number of the public samples is nearly
enough to solve the problem on its own.
The class of decision stumps on {±1}p has dual-VC-dimension p, but VC-dimension just logp, so this
lower bound implies that the polynomial dependence on the dual-VC-dimension in Theorem 10 cannot
be improved—there are classes with dual-VC-dimension p that require either Ω˜(
√
p/α) private samples
or Ω(1/α2) public samples.
Definition 12 (Binary Decision Stumps). For any p ∈ N, let Sp be a hypothesis class of hypotheses
h : {±1}p→ {±1} consisting of all hypotheses of the form hi(x) = xi for i ∈ [p].
Theorem 13 (Lower Bound for Releasing Decision Stumps). Fix any p ∈ N and α > 0. Suppose A is a
PAP algorithm that takes n private samples and m public samples, satisfies (1,1/4n)-differential privacy, and is
(α,α)-accurate for the class of decision stumps Sp. Then either n = Ω˜(√p/α) or m =Ω(1/α2).
Thus, if m = o(1/α2), then the number of private samples must scale proportionally to
√
p as in our
upper bound in Theorem 10.
The main ingredient in the proof is a result of Dwork et al. [DSS+15]. Informally, what this theorem
says is that for any algorithm that releases accurate answers to the class of decision stumps using too
small of a dataset, there is an attacker who can identify a large number of that algorithm’s samples.
Theorem 14 (Special Case of [DSS+15, Theorem 17]). For every p ∈ N and α > 0, there exists a number
r = Ω˜(
√
p
α ) and a number t = Ω(
1
α2
) such that the following holds: For every query-release algorithm A with
total sample size s ∈ [t, r + t] that is (α,α)-accurate for the class Sp of decision stumps on {±1}p, there exists a
distribution D˜ over {±1}p and an attacker T who takes as input the vector of answers q ∈ [−1,1]p and an example
y ∈ {±1}p and outputs either IN or OUT such that
P
z1 ,...,zs ,y∼D˜
q∼A(z)
[T (q,y) = OUT] ≥ 1− 1(r+t)2 , and
P
z1 ,...,zs∼D˜
q∼A(z)
[
|{i ∈ [s] : T (q,zi) = IN}| ≥ t2
]
≥ 1− 1(r+t)2 .
Proof of Theorem 13. Fix p,α > 0 and let r and t be the values specified in Theorem 14. Suppose that A is
a PAP algorithm that is (α,α)-accurate for the class Sp with n private samples andm public samples. We
will show that either n > r or m ≥ t/2. First, note that the accuracy condition of A implies that we must
have n +m > t by the standard lower bound on the sample complexity of query release even without
any privacy constraints. Thus, to prove the theorem statement, it suffices to show that if m ≤ t2 − 1, t <
n+m ≤ r + t, and A is (α,α)-accurate, then A cannot satisfy (1,1/4n)-differential privacy w.r.t. its private
samples. Indeed, this would imply that either m ≥ t/2 or n > t/2+ r > r.
Let D˜ be the distribution promised by Theorem 14. Let ~x = (x1, . . . ,xn) ∼ D˜n be a set of n private
samples and ~w = (w1, . . . ,wm) ∼ D˜m be a set of public samples, and let ~z = (x1, . . . ,xn,w1, . . . ,wm) be the
combined set of samples. Let q ∼ A(~z). By Theorem 14,
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P [|{i ∈ [n+m] : T (q,zi) = IN}| ≥m+1]
≥ P [|{i ∈ [n+m] : T (q,zi) = IN}| ≥ t/2]
≥ 1− 1/(r + t)2
≥ 1− 1/(n+m)2,
where the first inequality follows from the assumption that m ≤ t2 − 1, and the last inequality follows
from the assumption that n+m ≤ r + t.
That is, with high probability, the attacker identifies at least m + 1 samples in the dataset. Let
1 (T (q,zi) = IN) be the indicator of the event T (q,zi) = IN. Therefore, we have
n∑
i=1
P [T (q,xi) = IN] +
m∑
i=1
P [T (q,wi) = IN] ≥ (m+1)
(
1− 1/ (n+m)2
)
where the second step follows from Markov’s inequality. Since
m∑
i=1
P [T (q,wi) = IN] ≤m
we can conclude that
n∑
i=1
P [T (q,xi) = IN] ≥ (m+1)(1− 1/(n+m)2)−m
= 1− (m− 1)/(n+m)2
≥ 1− 1/(n+m)
≥ 1− 1/n ≥ 1/2
Therefore, there must exist a private sample i∗ such that
P
x,w∼D˜
q∼A(z)
[T (q,xi∗ ) = IN] ≥ 1/2n
Now, consider the dataset ~z∼i∗ where we replace xi∗ in ~z with an independent sample y ∼ D˜ but the rest
of the samples in ~z∼i∗ is the same as in ~z. In this experiment xi∗ is now an independent sample from D˜,
so Theorem 14 states that
P
~x,~w,y∼D˜
q∼A(~z∼i∗ )
[T (q,xi∗ ) = IN] ≤ 1/(n+m)2 ≤ 1/n2
However, note that the joint distribution (~z,~z∼i∗ ) is a distribution over pairs of datasets that differ on at
most one private sample. Therefore, we have shown that A cannot satisfy (ε,1/4n)-differential privacy
for its private samples unless
1
2n
≤ eε · 1
n2
+
1
4n
=⇒ ln(n/4) ≤ ε
Therefore, in particular, for n ≥ 11, A cannot be (1,1/4n)-differentially private.
5 A Lower Bound on Public Sample Complexity
The goal of this section is to show a general lower bound on the public sample complexity of PAP
query release. Our lower bound holds for classes with infinite Littlestone dimension. The Littlestone di-
mension is a combinatorial parameter of hypothesis classes that characterizes mistake and regret bounds
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in Online Learning [Lit88, BDPSS09]. There are many examples of classes that have finite VC-dimension,
but infinite Littlestone dimension. The simplest example is the class of threshold functions overRwhose
VC-dimension is 1, but has infinite Littlestone dimension. In [ALMM19], it was shown that if a class has
infinite Littlestone dimension, then it is not privately learnable.
Our lower bound is formally stated in the following theorem.
Theorem 15 (Lower bound on public sample complexity). LetH⊆ {±1}X be any query class that has infinite
Littlestone dimension. Any PAP query-release algorithm forH must have public sample complexity m =Ω(1/α),
where α is the desired accuracy.
We stress that the above lower bound on the public sample complexity holds regardless of the num-
ber of private samples, which can be arbitrarily large.
In the light of our upper bound in Section 3, our lower bound on the public sample complexity
exhibits a tight dependence on the accuracy parameter α. That is, one cannot hope to attain public
sample complexity that is o(1/α).
In the proof of the above theorem, we will refer to the following notion of private PAC learning with
access to public data that was defined in [ABM19]. For completeness, we restate this definition here.
Definition 16 ((α,β,ε,δ) PAP Learner). Let H ⊂ {±1}X be a hypothesis class. A randomized algorithm
A is (α,β,ε,δ) PAP learner for H with private sample size n and public sample size m if the following
conditions hold:
1. For every distribution D over Z = X × {±1}, given data sets ~x ∼ Dn and ~w ∼ Dm as inputs to A,
with probability at least 1 − β (over the choice of ~x, ~w, and the random coins of A), A outputs a
hypothesis A (~x, ~w) = hˆ ∈ {±1}X satisfying
errD
(
hˆ
)
≤ inf
h∈H
errD (h) +α,
where, for any hypothesis h ∈ {±1}X , errD(h) , P
(x,y)∼D
[h(x) , y].
2. For all ~w ∈ Zm, A (·, ~w) is (ε,δ)-differentially private.
We say that A is proper PAP learner if A (~x, ~w) ∈ H with probability 1.
Proof. We prove the above theorem in two simple steps that follow from prior works: the first step
shows that PAP query-release implies PAP learning, and the second step invokes a known lower bound
on PAP learning of classes with infinite Littlestone dimension. Both steps are formalized in the lemmas
below.
Lemma 17 (General version of Theorem 5.5 in [BNS13] ). LetH⊆ {±1}X be any class of binary functions. If
there exists an (α,β,ε,δ) PAP query-release algorithm forH with private sample complexity n and public sample
complexity m, then there exists an (O(α),O(β),O(ε),O(δ)) PAP learner for H with private sample complexity
n′ =O(n log(1/αβ)/α2β), and public sample complexity m.
Lemma 18 ([ABM19, Theorem 4.1]). Let H be any class with an infinite Littlestone dimension (e.g., the class
of thresholds over R). Then, any PAP learner for H must have public sample complexity m =Ω(1/α), where α is
the excess error.
Given these two lemmas, the proof is straightforward. To elaborate, note that Lemma 17 shows
that for any class H, a PAP query-release algorithm for H with public sample complexity m implies
the existence of a PAP learner for H with the same public sample complexity (and essentially the same
accuracy and privacy parameters). Hence, by Lemma 18, if H has infinite Littlestone dimension, then
such public sample complexity must satisfy m =Ω(1/α). This proves our theorem.
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Although the proof of Lemma 17 is almost straightforward given [BNS13, Theorem 5.5], we will
elaborate on a couple of minor details. First, note that even though the reduction in [BNS13] involves
pure differentially private algorithms, the same construction in their reduction would also work for
the case of (ε,δ)-differential privacy with minor and obvious changes in the privacy analysis. Second,
we note that the reduction in [BNS13] is for “proper sanitizers,” which are query-release algorithms
that are restricted to output a data set from the input domain rather than any data structure that maps
H to [−1,1]. As discussed in Remark 9, ignoring computational complexity, any PAP query-release
algorithm satisfying Definition 8 can be transformed into a PAP query-release algorithm that outputs a
data set from the input domain and has the same accuracy (up to a constant factor). Now, given these
minor details and since any PAP algorithm can obviously be viewed as a differentially private algorithm
operating on the private data set (by “hardwiring” the public data set into the algorithm), Lemma 17
simply follows by invoking the reduction in [BNS13].
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